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The food industry has always been an important area of investigation for 
researchers both theoretical and empirical Industrial Organization. Intense market 
dynamics and greater availability of data in this industry have provided the profession 
with even more research opportunities. In the early 1990’s, the Institut D’Economie 
Industrielle (IDEI) and the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) joined 
together to organize a bi-annual conference that would bring together world specialists in 
such topics as imperfect competition and market power, auctions, and contract theory.  
The purpose of the conferences would be to discuss the lessons to be drawn for agro-food 
markets from the most recent advances in their fields.1 This special issue of JEMS puts 
together a selection of papers most of which were given at the 5th INRA-IDEI conference 
on “Industrial Organization and the Food-Processing Industry” organized in Toulouse in 
June 2002.2 This introduction presents the fundamental ideas explored in these papers 
and their main implications. 
The paper by Diana M. Burton, H. Alan Love, Gokhan Ozertan, and Curtis R. 
Taylor presents a model that highlights the problems raised by property rights protection 
                                                 
1 The IDEI, a research center strongly devoted to theoretical and applied IO, was 
lead by Jean-Jacques Laffont (who founded it in 1990) and Jean Tirole. Laffont passed 
away on May 1, 2004. The INRA is a French government-owned organization devoted to 
research pertaining to agriculture. 
 
2 We thank Dan Spulber for his editorial help in preparing this special issue of the Journal 
of Economics & Management Strategy (JEMS). All articles published in this special 
issue were subject to the full standard JEMS editorial and refereeing process. 
 
of biotechnology innovations, in particular, those of genetically modified seeds, which is 
currently an important issue in world agriculture. Biotechnology innovations are indeed 
revolutionizing the agro-food sector and raising new organizational and marketing issues 
in this industry. Self-replicating biotechnology innovations, such as genetically modified 
seeds, not only face competition from other innovations but also from possible copies. 
Burton at al. examine three mechanisms that a Genetically Modified (GM) seeds 
producer can use to protect its intellectual property rights: short-term contracts (the most 
common in the industry), long-term contracts, and the use of biotechnological protection 
methods that make progeny GM seeds sterile (the so-called “terminator technology”). 
They show that the possibility of piracy intensifies competition generated by the durable 
nature of the good. Taking piracy, its detection, and its punishment into account, they 
show that the technology protection system yields seeds producers the highest profits 
while farmers are better-off under short term or even long-term contracts. In terms of 
social welfare, the terminator technology is dominated by long-term contracts, while the 
comparison between short and long term contracts depends on the monitoring cost. An 
implication is that unless the terminator technology starts to be implemented, one would 
expect a dramatic modification in the nature of the contractual relationship between seeds 
producers and farmers, namely, a likely move towards longer term instruments. 
In agricultural and food markets where perfect competition is more the exception 
than the rule, marketing activities often involve auction mechanisms. The paper by 
Philippe Février, William Roos, and Michael Visser studies a particular auction 
mechanism often used for flowers in the Netherlands and wine or champagne in France. 
The mechanism gives the winner the option of buying any available quantity of the good 
at the winning bid price in English ascending auctions. The authors develop and estimate 
a structural model using data from wine auctions at the largest auction house in Paris in 
2000 (Drouot). They perform a test of the behavioral auction mechanism modeled and 
show why the auctioneer willing to sell multiple identical units of a same good may 
prefer to use this mechanism. They also empirically show that the revenue effect coming 
from this buyer’s option (relative to sequential auctions without such an option) is 
negligible, but that the large amount of time saved by this mechanism may explain its 
use. This nice contribution puts emphasis on the role of transaction costs in marketing 
large quantities of goods and in explaining the use and development of auctions and 
contracting mechanisms particularly in agro-food markets.  
The paper by Porametr Leegomonchai and Tomislav Vukina is an example 
of recent empirical applications of contract theory to agriculture. Marketing and 
production contracts between farmers, growers and different sorts of intermediaries are 
increasingly used in the agro-food industry. In livestock production including broiler 
chickens and hogs, production contracts are often used between farmers and industry 
processors in order to provide incentives for efficiency. Moreover, many of these 
contracts occur repeatedly. Leegomonchai and Vukina study the strategic allocation of 
inputs by broiler processors facing heterogeneous growers. In a two-period model, two 
types of dynamic incentives can lead to strategic discrimination, either a career concerns 
or a ratchet-effect type of incentives. Using panel data on broiler contracts, the authors 
find no significant input discrimination. This empirical application thus proves very 
useful for the welfare analysis of common contract practices in agriculture. Agricultural 
contracts of this kind are observed for livestock, grains, and other commodities and offer 
a rare field where many of the ideas and predictions of contract theory seem particularly 
relevant and can be used and tested. 
The paper by Jean-Pierre Dubé combines econometric and simulation methods to 
assess the competitive and welfare impacts of merger episodes that occupied the debate 
in the US soft drink industry during the 1980s. Dubé makes the important observation 
that, typically, households purchase soft drinks in the form of multi-unit as well as multi-
variety bundles which makes fitting supermarket aggregate scanned data to standard 
discrete single-unit choice models inadequate. The author then suggests basing demand-
side estimation on a consumer decision model that makes a distinction between purchase 
and consumption decisions. Estimation then is performed by appending to this multiple-
unit-purchase-consistent demand module a supply module that reflects Bertrand 
competition for differentiated products. This estimated structural model of demand is 
then used to simulate the impact of the hypothetical mergers which are all found to imply 
large welfare losses although not all so large price increases. 
While Dubé puts emphasis on “realistic” modeling of demand and on the merger 
policy implications of the estimated structural parameters, Tirtha Dhar, Jean-Paul 
Chavas, Ronald W. Cotterill, and Brian W. Gould insist on “flexibility” in demand 
specification when investigating the nature of strategic interaction between the two major 
players in the soft drink industry, Coca-Cola Co and PepsiCo. In the spirit of the New 
Empirical Industrial Organization literature, Dhar et al. specify a nonlinear Almost Ideal 
Demand system for firms’ brands and derive first-order conditions for profit 
maximization following a conjectural variation (CV) approach. The resulting “generic” 
model is estimated with full information maximum likelihood using data on four major 
brands offered by the two firms and tests of firms’ brand-level price conduct are 
performed. No evidence of price collusion is found in a test of a collusive model against a 
CV model that nests it. Moreover, the authors reject Bertrand- and Stackelberg-type 
conjectures and find a high sensitivity of elasticity and market power (Lerner index) 
estimates to model specification. 
Arturs Kalnins makes use of limited dependent variable regression techniques to 
analyze a data set on 142 international fast-food franchising contracts signed in the U.S. 
during the period 1982-1999. He finds these contracts specifying a target number of 
outlets franchisees must deploy, to obtain from franchisors exclusive rights to an assigned 
market, that are typically not achieved. Moreover, the size of these deployment 
commitments turns out to be negatively correlated with the actual number of units that 
remain active. The author discusses possible theoretical explanations for this result, 
namely, contractors’ market potential overestimation, tradeoff between asset risk and 
return, signaling of quality, and strategic preempting and argues that systematic 
overestimation of market potential by franchisors and franchisees is the most plausible 
justification. 
These six articles provide a good illustration of the diversity of the research 
directions that are currently taken to study the industrial organization aspects of the agro-
food industry. There remain many new challenges in the analysis of agricultural 
production, its organization, and the distribution and marketing mechanisms that support 
it. Such an objective calls for a good understanding by agricultural economists of the role 
of nonlinear pricing strategies and sophisticated marketing and contracting mechanisms. 
Normative issues raised by agriculture policies also are expected to be on the future 
research agenda. Current advances in Industrial Organization and contract theory and the 
increasing availability of data on the food distribution and production sectors open many 
exciting research areas. 
 
